The innovation process of a privately-owned enterprise and a state-owned enterprise in China by Kang Byeongwoo
The innovation process of a privately-owned
enterprise and a state-owned enterprise in
China
著者 Kang Byeongwoo
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 470
year 2014-07-01
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1352
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: China, Patent data, Privately-owned enterprise, State-owned enterprise 
JEL classification: L25, L96, O31 
  
* Researcher, Technological Innovation and Economic Growth Studies Group, 
Inter-disciplinary Studies Center, IDE (byeongwoo_kang@ide.go.jp) 
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 470 
 
The Innovation Process of a Privately-Owned 
Enterprise and a State-Owned Enterprise in 
China 
 
Byeongwoo Kang* 
 
July 2014 
Abstract  
This study compares the innovation process of a privately-owned enterprise and a 
state-owned enterprise in China using their patent data. Huawei and ZTE were 
selected for this study because they experienced the same historical environment in 
the same industry from the same region in China leaving their owner types as their 
critical difference. This study investigates the difference in the innovation process in 
R&D between a privately-owned and a state-owned enterprise by analyzing (1) 
domestic and international patent application pattern, (2) co-application and 
co-applicants, (3) knowledge accumulation inside Huawei and ZTE, and (4) 
knowledge spillover to domestic and foreign firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 Recent years have witnessed an explosion of domestic and international patent 
filing by Chinese firms. According to a report by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) in 2011, ZTE Corporation and Huawei Technologies Co, Ltd, 
both Chinese telecommunication equipment manufacturers, ranked 1 and 3 respectively 
as Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applicants (Table 1). This burst of Chinese patent 
filings has raised the question of whether this increase in patent applications in China 
reflects a growth in Chinese R&D capability. To answer this question, two studies 
sought to explain the recent surge of Chinese patent applications. Hu et al. (2009) found 
that China’s patent explosion can be attributed to the increase in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and patent system reform while the intensification of research and 
development (R&D) has had little effect. Then a recent study by Li (2012) found that a 
more significant reason has been the patent subsidy program by local governments.  
 
Table 1. Published PCT International Applications by Top Five Applicants 
2011 Ranking Applicant Country of 
Origin 
PCT applications 
published in 2011 
1 ZTE Corporation China 2826 
2 Panasonic Corporation Japan 2463 
3 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd China 1831 
4 Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha Japan 1755 
5 Robert Bosch Corporation Germany 1518 
Source: WIPO (2011). 
 
 An interesting finding in Table 1 is that ZTE, a state-owned enterprise, 
outperformed the other top applicants, all privately-owned enterprises, in terms of R&D. 
It is generally accepted that patenting correlates positively with R&D, although not 
every result of R&D is patented (Pakes et al., 1980). Since a privately-owned enterprise 
is aimed at profit maximization and a state-owned enterprise at purposes other than 
profit maximization, that finding is counterintuitive. R&D is a sunk cost spent for 
innovation. Without a system that protects an innovator from free riders, no one will 
invest such a sunk cost for R&D. The patent system bestows on the patent owner a legal 
monopoly for the use of the invention described in a patent document. Accordingly, a 
patent applicant is rewarded for its R&D sunk cost and can increase its profit. 
 That finding prompted the research questions examined in this study. Is this 
evidence that a state-owned enterprise can be more innovative than a privately-owned 
enterprise? And how does a state-owned enterprise perform differently from a 
privately-owned one? To answer these questions, this study investigates how a 
state-owned enterprise and a privately-owned one innovate.1 I chose ZTE and Huawei 
as representative of a state-owned and a privately-owned enterprise, respectively. 
Choosing appropriate research samples is very important for comparison because 
innovation pattern can be explained as the outcome of different technological regimes 
(Breschi et al., 2000; Lee et al., 2001). As will be discussed later in this study, Huawei 
and ZTE have almost the same history and operate in almost the same field of business 
in the same industry. Their one critical difference is ownership type. Thus, I assume that 
the difference in their innovation pattern is largely affected by the difference in their 
ownerships. 
This study uses Huawei’s and ZTE’s patent data to compare their innovation 
process. Even if their patent filings are a result of non-R&D factors including the 
increase in FDI, patent system reform, and the patent subsidy program (Hu et al., 2009; 
Li, 2012), patent data provide valuable information for understanding the innovation 
process. Patent statistics (Griliches, 1990), statistical information retrieved from a large 
number of patent documents, is widely used to measure innovation performance. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section discusses previous 
literature on privately-owned and state-owned enterprises. Section 3 gives a brief 
overview of Huawei and ZTE. Section 4 presents the research data and shows the 
findings of this study. Section 5 discusses the findings. Section 6 concludes with 
remarks on the implications and the limitations of this study. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate performance of state-owned enterprises and privately-owned enterprises 
 There is a large accumulation of literature gathered over a long period of time 
discussing the corporate performance of state-owned and privately-owned enterprises, 
and much of this literature indicates that the former performs more poorly and 
inefficiently than the latter (Boardman et al., 1989). For example, Majumdar (1998) 
evaluated the differences in the performance of government-owned, mixed, and private 
enterprises in India using the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) for the period 
1973-1974 to 1988-1989. He found that the government-owned enterprises performed 
the least efficiently while the mixed enterprises performed more efficiently and the 
private ones performed the most efficiently. 
                                                   
1 The National Bureau of Statistics of China classifies Chinese firms into six groups 
in terms of ownership (Appendix A). However, studies on China generally have 
classified them only as state-owned or privately-owned enterprises. 
China’s case is no exception. Guan et al., (2009) showed that state-owned 
enterprises did not outperform privately-owned ones in that country. Considering that 
state-owned enterprises receive special support from the government, such as 
acquisition of import and export rights, priority access to resources, and the use of 
distribution channel, their finding implied that innovation by state-owned enterprises is 
less effective than that of non-state-owned enterprises. In addition, a study by Pyke et al. 
(2000) conducted a survey comparing state-owned, collectively-owned, and 
privately-owned enterprises in China. The study found that state-owned enterprises lag 
behind in the implementation of advanced manufacturing technologies and increasing 
production capability although most other indicators did not show significant difference 
among the three.  
A theory explaining why state-owned enterprises show poorer corporate 
performance than privately-owned enterprises argues that, in general, state-owned 
enterprises cannot provide incentives to innovate and to reduce costs as much as 
privately-owned enterprises can (Shleifer, 1998). Since state-owned enterprises are 
owned by the state, politicians and bureaucrats use them for their political goals and for 
themselves. Politicians and bureaucrats give benefits such as job opportunities and 
business contracts to political supporters and contributors. Under such an environment, 
since decision making is not based on the market, it does not matter if an enterprise 
operates inefficiently. Thus, managers of state-owned enterprises avoid risks in an 
uncertain environment. 
  
2.2. Role of the state-owned enterprises in China 
A large amount of literature indicates that the corporate performance of 
state-owned enterprises is poorer than that of privately-owned ones. However, such 
criticism does not imply that every state-owned enterprise must be closed or privatized. 
It is not fair to compare privately-owned and state-owned enterprises merely in terms of 
corporate performances because privately-owned enterprises are aimed at profit 
maximization while state-owned enterprises operate for the purposes of the government, 
such as maximizing the social welfare of a designated government organization. 
China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council (SASAC) is a commission that manages state-owned enterprises. SASAC 
evaluates the performance of the state-owned enterprises under its control and can 
appoint and remove managers. SASAC oversees 117 state-owned enterprises and 
supervises their management. Although the classification of these enterprises is not 
clear-cut, it helps to understand the roles of the state-owned enterprises in China. Below 
are three representative roles these enterprises play. 
First, the state-owned enterprises serve in key industries such as electricity, oil, 
and steel. Many of the state-owned enterprises overseen by SASAC are run for this 
purpose. Examples are firms such as the China Power Investment Corporation, China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation, and China Datang Corporation. 
Second, the state-owned enterprises take the initiative in areas that 
privately-owned enterprises are unable or reluctant to enter but which are necessary for 
national development. Ventures in heavy industry require vast initial investment. For 
example, the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, China Shipbuilding Industry 
Corporation, and China First Heavy Industry fall into this category. 
Third, state-owned enterprises serve as a coordinator to encourage knowledge 
diffusion from leading foreign firms to domestic firms. Building up technological 
capability to innovate and to compete with advanced foreign firms is a major concern 
for China. In fact, Alcatel-Lucent Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd., and Aviation Industry 
Corporation of China operate for this purpose (Fernandez et al., 2007; Szamosszegi et 
al., 2012). 
 
2.3. History of state-owned and privately-owned enterprises in China 
 Despite the role they have played in the country’s economic growth, many of 
China’s state-owned enterprises have been privatized over the course of the country’s 
economic reforms (Chow, 2004; Kang et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Nee et al., 2007; 
Young, 1995; Yusuf et al., 2005). In this subsection, I briefly review the administrative 
history of the state-owned and privately-owned enterprises in China to understand how 
the environment surrounding firms in China changed. 
China’s first attempt to create a framework for the modern corporation can be 
traced back to 1904 when a corporation law was passed. But when the People’s 
Republic of China was established by the Communist Party in 1949, the law was 
nullified. Since the Communist Party represented the working class and private 
entrepreneurs were regarded as the capitalist economic class, privately-owned 
enterprises were strictly banned (In fact, private entrepreneurs were not allowed to 
obtain Communist Party membership until the Party’s sixteenth congress in 2002). The 
whole economy was run by state-owned enterprises in accordance with the plans of the 
central government. Thus, decision making in the state-owned enterprises was not 
market-driven (and remains less than fully market driven today). 
A market economy started in China with the economic reforms that began in 
1978 under Deng Xiaoping. Although private businesses were still heavily restricted, 
the State Council ratified the introduction of free markets in 1979. A big step was 
achieved in 1984 when the State Council promulgated enterprise reforms. Under these 
reforms state-owned enterprises were granted autonomy. Henceforth they were allowed 
to retain some of their profit for investment purposes instead of remitting it all to the 
state. The reforms also began the privatization of state-owned enterprises. A market 
economy system with market-based price setting and resource allocation also started to 
spread rapidly. In 1993 China’s Company Law was enacted which called for the 
maximization of owners’ interest as the primary goal of corporate practice. On the 
surface the enactment of the Company Law removed the government’s control over the 
state-owned enterprises. 
As described above, a major component of China’s economic reform was 
giving the state-owned enterprises autonomy in production, marketing, and investment 
decisions rather than having them produce goods as planned by the government. 
However even after the reforms, scholars and other governments question whether 
China’s state-owned enterprises can have full autonomy and still have to submit to 
government intervention (Child et al., 1996; Rogers, 2012). In fact, state-owned 
enterprises even now sometimes choose state interests over market returns 
(Szamosszegi et al., 2012).  
 
 
3. Huawei and ZTE2 
 Based on the above review of the literature on state-owned and 
privately-owned enterprises, I assume that the innovation process of the former differs 
from that of the latter. Starting from this assumption, this study examines a state-owned 
and a privately-owned enterprise in a case study to understand the difference in 
innovation process between the two. 
I chose Huawei and ZTE for this case study for two reasons. First, they are in 
the China’s telecommunications industry. China has played “catch-up” in this industry, 
and it is generally accepted that it has been successful. In addition, China has built up a 
basis for long-term innovation in the industry (Lee et al., 2009). Second, prior studies 
(Harwit, 2007; Gao, 2011) have showed that Huawei and ZTE stand out among the 
players in China’s effort to catch up. Other representative companies in China’s 
telecommunications industry have been Eastcom, Datang and Great Dragon. Eastcom’s 
strategy of merely buying foreign advanced technology without accumulating 
technological capability did not increase its revenue (Gao, 2011). Datang had 
technological capability and was the main developer of Time Division Synchronous 
Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), but the company failed to achieve 
                                                   
2 Most of the information profiling Huawei and ZTE comes from their webpages and 
from http://www.chinese-champions.com (Last access: 10/06/2014). 
commercial success (Gao, 2011). Great Dragon, which became a conglomerate when 
the Chinese government decided to amalgamate domestic manufacturers into one in 
1995, could not survive a price war initiated by domestic competitors (Harwit, 2007). 
Meanwhile, despite their short histories, Huawei and ZTE have achieved rapid growth 
in global markets (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Huawei’s and ZTE’s Growth in the 2000s 
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(Source: GTA Data and Huawei’s and ZTE’s annual reports) 
 
Huawei is a global telecommunications equipment manufacturer. It was 
founded by Ren Zhengfei in 1987 in Shenzhen. After working for the army and a 
state-owned enterprise, Ren started his business as a sales agent for a Hong Kong 
company producing private branch exchange (PBX) switches. The company achieved 
rapid growth, and today Huawei has become one of the top telecommunications 
equipment suppliers. The company is famous for its active R&D. Nearly 50 per cent of 
all the employees are R&D staff. The shareholders of Huawei are the Union of Huawei 
Investment & Holdings Co., Ltd. and Ren; the former is wholly owned by Huawei’s 
employees, meaning that Huawei is owned by its employees. 
ZTE also is a global telecommunications equipment manufacturer. ZTE was 
founded in 1985 in Shenzhen by a group of state-owned enterprises associated with 
China's Ministry of Aerospace. With the government seeing the need for more domestic 
companies to produce telecommunications switches, ZTE expanded its business into the 
telecommunications industry (Harwit, 2007). The largest shareholder is Shenzhen 
Zhongxingxin Telecommunications Equipment Company Limited (Zhongxingxin), a 
state-owned shareholder (ZTE, 2013). ZTE claims its business model is a “state-owned 
and privately-managed (guo you si ying)” one (Harwit, 2007). Nevertheless, since the 
largest shareholder is a state-owned entity, it is natural to assume that ZTE’s 
management is influenced by Zhongxingxin for governmental purposes.  
Information about Huawei and ZTE is summarized in Table 2. As can be seen, 
the two companies have almost the same history and operate in almost the same field of 
business with one critical difference: their type of ownership. Huawei is 
privately-owned while ZTE is state-owned. As seen from their histories, Huawei and 
ZTE have experienced the same historical environment in the same industry within the 
same city, leaving their type of ownership as the critical difference. In the following 
analysis I examine whether the difference in their ownership type affected the difference 
in their innovation process. 
 
Table 2. Information about Huawei and ZTE 
 Huawei ZTE 
Name 
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. 
(华为技术有限公司) 
Zhongxing Telecommunication 
Equipment Corporation 
(中兴通讯股份有限公司) 
Founded 1987 1985 
Headquarters Shenzhen, Guangdong, China Shenzhen, Guangdong, China 
Industry 
Telecommunications equipment 
Networking equipment 
Telecommunications equipment 
Shareholders 
(as of 2013) 
- Huawei Investment & Holding 
Co., Ltd. (98.6%) 
- Ren Zhengfei (1.4%) 
- Zhongxingxin (30.1%) 
- HKSCC Nominees (18.3%) 
- CITIC Trust (1.7%) 
- Hunan Nantian (1.1%) 
- etc 
Owner type Private State 
 
 
4. Data and Findings 
4.1. Patent data 
 I examined the patent data that Huawei and ZTE submitted to the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of the People’s Republic of China and to the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (US PTO) from the time of each company’s founding until 
2012. I also examined PCT applications filed with SIPO during the same period. The 
PCT is administered by the International Bureau of WIPO. Since the PCT enables a 
patent application filed with one patent authority to be effective with other patent 
authorities of PCT contracting states, companies doing business in global markets file 
many PCT applications. 
 The numbers of annual patent applications by Huawei and ZTE are shown in 
Tables 3-1 and 3-2, respectively. The patent application data held by SIPO indicates that 
Huawei started to apply for patents from 1995 and ZTE 1999. It took 8 years and 14 
years respectively from their foundings for Huawei and ZTE to file their first patent 
applications. Although ZTE was established earlier than Huawei, it filed its first patent 
application later than Huawei. There are endogenous and exogenous explanations for 
this gap. An endogenous explanation is that ZTE did not have enough technological 
capability to conduct R&D; and even if it had, it did not have a culture for legally 
protecting its R&D output. An exogenous explanation is the social environment in 
China. As a communist country, private ownership of property has generally been 
prohibited. In addition, even if inventions by a state-owned enterprise are patented, the 
state makes decisions for the usage of the patent.3 Thus, firms in China, especially 
state-owned enterprises, were not motivated to actively apply for patents before China’s 
economic and political reforms. 
The second columns in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show the number of patent 
applications to SIPO. From 1999 Huawei’s and ZTE’s patent applications to SIPO 
increased rapidly and continuously until the late 2000s. This increase implies that their 
R&D activities increased, which in the case of ZTE is also supported by the increase in 
the number of its R&D employees in the 2000s. Considering that ZTE’s R&D staff 
accounts for about half of its employees (Figure 2), ZTE is being more aggressive in 
applying for patents than is Huawei. Since peaking around 2008/2009, the number of 
patent applications for both companies has been decreasing. An explanation for this 
drop could be the nature of the patent database. The Worldwide Patent Statistical 
Database (October 2012 edition) of the European Patent Office, the patent database 
used in this study, is constructed from the published patent documents. A patent 
application to SIPO is published 18 months after the date of receipt of the application, if 
the applicant does not request early publication. Thus, the significant decrease from 
                                                   
3 The Patent Law of the People's Republic of China was amended to mandate in Article 
14 the submission of prior art: “If an invention patent of a State-owned enterprise or 
institution is of great significance to national or public interests, upon approval by the 
State Council, the relevant competent department under the State Council or the 
people's government of the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under 
the Central Government may decide to have the patent widely applied within an 
approved scope and allow the designated units to exploit the patent, and the said units 
shall pay royalties to the patentee in accordance with the regulations of the State.” 
2010 is presumably due to the delay in the publication of patent applications. 
 The third and the fourth columns in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show respectively the 
number of patent applications to the US PTO and the number of PCT applications. 
Interestingly, US applications and PCT applications by both Huawei and ZTE started 
from 2000. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 
2001 probably made the Chinese firms consider to expand their business into the global 
market and accordingly, as a first step, file international patent applications. 
Applications to the US PTO and PCT applications by both companies continued to 
increase until recently. For both firms, the ratio of PCT applications to applications to 
SIPO has been much higher than that of the US PTO applications to applications to 
SIPO. This is because the PCT application allows an applicant to delay up to 30 months 
after the first patent filing the making of any strategic decision, and hence the PCT 
applicant has a longer time to consider a strategic patent filing. As was seen with patent 
applications to SIPO, the number of US PTO and PCT applications has been decreasing. 
Presumably, as with the sharp drop in patent applications to SIPO, this is also due to the 
delay in publishing patent applications. The two tables show that in recent years Huawei 
had tended to file more patent applications than ZTE with the US patent office while 
ZTE has been filing more PCT applications than Huawei has. 
 
Figure 2. Size of R&D Staff in Huawei and ZTE 
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(Source: Huawei’s and ZTE’s annual reports 2007-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-1. Huawei’s Patent Applications 
Year CN US PCT US/CN (%) PCT/CN (%) 
1987~1994 - - - - - 
1995 5 - - - - 
1996 11 - - - - 
1997 17 - - - - 
1998 22 - - - - 
1999 86 - - - - 
2000 181 1 8 0.6 4.4 
2001 452 4 30 0.9 6.6 
2002 1003 12 83 1.2 8.3 
2003 1482 57 111 3.8 7.5 
2004 2098 67 175 3.2 8.3 
2005 3490 103 424 3.0 12.1 
2006 5714 261 1177 4.6 20.6 
2007 4601 343 1542 7.5 33.5 
2008 4237 470 1870 11.1 44.1 
2009 3030 597 1984 19.7 65.5 
2010 2110 420 1364 19.9 64.6 
2011 732 653 1706 89.2 233.1 
2012 - 155 118 - - 
1987 ~ 2012 29271 3143 10592   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2. ZTE’s Patent Applications 
Year CN US PCT US/CN (%) PCT/CN (%) 
1985~1998 - - - - - 
1999 2 - - - - 
2000 19 - 2 - 10.5 
2001 121 3 13 2.5 10.7 
2002 215 2 43 0.9 20.0 
2003 431 11 89 2.6 20.6 
2004 525 21 187 4.0 35.6 
2005 972 36 238 3.7 24.5 
2006 2154 23 430 1.1 20.0 
2007 4516 55 369 1.2 8.2 
2008 4416 167 1150 3.8 26.0 
2009 5832 365 3412 6.3 58.5 
2010 3443 367 2099 10.7 61.0 
2011 770 14 29 1.8 3.8 
2012 - 3 - - - 
1985 ~ 2012 23416 1067 8061   
 
The numbers of patents granted annually to Huawei and ZTE per application 
year are shown in Tables 4-1 and 4-2, respectively. The grant rate in domestic and 
international patent applications has decreased as the 2000s have progressed. Assuming 
that there has been no change in the norm needed to examine patentability despite the 
boost in global patent applications, the rise in Huawei and ZTE patent applications 
should affect the quality of their invention. Huawei and ZTE has applied for patents 
without owning by disclosing knowledge before the knowledge is owned by 
competitors. This strategic behavior gives a degree of freedom for future R&D. The 
sharp drop in the grant rate of both firms in recent years presumably can be explained 
by the time lag for patent examination. The statistics are similar for both Huawei and 
ZTE showing no clear difference between the two in the rate of patents granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-1. Huawei’s Granted Patents 
 Granted Grant rate (%) 
(= Granted / Application) 
Application 
Year 
CN US CN (%) US (%) 
1987~1994 - - - - 
1995 5 - 100.0 - 
1996 10 - 58.8 - 
1997 16 - 57.1 - 
1998 20 - 80.0 - 
1999 82 - 73.9 - 
2000 171 - 88.1 0.0 
2001 440 4 88.5 100.0 
2002 946 11 80.4 91.7 
2003 1316 54 77.5 91.5 
2004 1790 62 75.1 92.5 
2005 2816 75 70.1 72.8 
2006 4016 156 57.1 59.1 
2007 2638 191 42.3 55.2 
2008 1755 193 28.3 40.6 
2009 584 162 11.4 27.0 
2010 125 73 3.5 16.6 
2011 2 57 0.1 8.2 
2012 - - 0.0 0.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-2. ZTE’s Granted Patents 
 Granted Grant rate (%) 
(= Granted / Application) 
Application 
Year 
CN US CN (%) US (%) 
1985~1998 - - - - 
1999 2 - 66.7 - 
2000 19 - 100.0 - 
2001 121 3 98.4 100.0 
2002 199 2 86.1 100.0 
2003 400 11 84.4 100.0 
2004 492 17 79.4 73.9 
2005 829 28 68.2 77.8 
2006 1506 19 60.1 82.6 
2007 3045 17 58.3 30.4 
2008 2146 24 42.4 13.2 
2009 879 13 12.2 3.4 
2010 - 5 0.0 1.3 
2011 - - 0.0 0.0 
2012 - - 0.0 0.0 
 
4.2. Co-applicants and inventors 
 Recent environmental changes such as shortened product life cycles, increasing 
technological complexities, and the increasing cost of R&D have made it necessary to 
utilize external knowledge sources. Collaboration with others is one channel to external 
knowledge sources. Collaboration with others appears as co-applications in the patent 
data. Table 5 shows the number of applicants and inventors in Huawei’s and ZTE’s 
patent applications to SIPO. For both firms, the number of applicants has slightly 
increased since their first patent applications. Until the mid 2000s, their patent 
applications were filed only by themselves. Since 2004 and 2005, their co-applications 
have increased although the increase is slight. When the two companies are compared, 
Huawei has more co-applicants than ZTE has, implying that Huawei is more active in 
utilizing external knowledge sources. The number of inventors in both firms’ patent 
applications has also increased slightly with Huawei showing slightly more inventors 
than ZTE. 
 
Table 5. Applicant and Inventor in Huawei’s and ZTE’s Patent Applications to SIPO 
 Huawei ZTE 
Year Number of 
Applicants 
Number of 
Inventors 
Number of 
Applicants 
Number of 
Inventors 
1987~1994 - - - - 
1995 1. 1.800 - - 
1996 1. 1.545 - - 
1997 1. 1.882 - - 
1998 1. 1.955 - - 
1999 1. 2.093 1. 1. 
2000 1. 1.895 1. 1.263 
2001 1. 1.699 1. 1.405 
2002 1. 1.506 1. 1.758 
2003 1. 1.578 1. 1.710 
2004 1.002 1.687 1. 2.109 
2005 1.004 1.759 1.001 2.295 
2006 1.011 1.964 1.002 2.283 
2007 1.013 2.322 1.002 2.255 
2008 1.021 2.607 1.002 2.150 
2009 1.034 2.747 1.003 2.281 
2010 1.015 2.427 1.005 2.230 
2011 1.007 2.202 1.025 2.216 
 
Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show the share of Huawei and ZTE co-applicants by type. 
Huawei (Figure 3-1) has had 56 co-applicants in total; these have been 29 universities, 
19 domestic firms, 5 foreign firms, 1 national institute and 8 individuals. Universities 
account for slightly over 50 per cent of all the co-applicants. This indicates that Huawei 
is active in university-industry collaboration (UIC). Meanwhile ZTE (Figures 3-2) has 
had 32 co-applicants in total: 7 universities, 15 domestic firms, 1 foreign firm, 4 
national institutes, and 5 individuals. The domestic firms among ZTE’s co-applicants 
account for nearly 50 per cent of all the co-applicants. Further analysis of whether 
collaboration with ZTE has helped these domestic firms innovate beyond the knowledge 
they received from ZTE will be presented in subsection 4.3. 
The figures show that ZTE has more collaboration with national institutes. 
While Huawei has collaborated with only one such institute (1.8 per cent), ZTE has 
collaborated with four (12.5 per cent). This greater collaboration with national institutes 
implies that ZTE is an important partner for these institutes. ZTE being a state-owned 
enterprise could be a factor for this greater collaboration. However, because of the lack 
of data, it is difficult to gauge how ZTE is involved in collaboration with the national 
institutes. 
 
Figure 3-1. Huawei’s Co-applicants in Patent Applications to US PTO 
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Figure 3-2. ZTE’s Co-applicants in Patent Applications to US PTO 
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 Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the share of the co-applications per each co-applicant 
type shown in Figures 3-1 and 3-2. Huawei co-applied for 491 patents: 437 with 
universities, 34 with domestic firms, 11 with foreign firms, 1 with a national institute, 
and 8 with individuals. Universities accounted for 89.0 per cent (= 437 / 491 × 100) of 
all co-applications. Although co-applicants other than universities made up nearly 50 
per cent of Huawei’s co-applicants, its collaborations with these co-applicants 
accounted for only 11.0 per cent (= 54 / 491 × 100) of Huawei’s co-applications. Thus, 
Huawei’s collaboration is concentrated in universities. This may be because Huawei is 
the leading domestic firm in the telecommunications industry, and it is difficult for 
Huawei to find firms qualified for collaboration. In the case of ZTE, its rate of 
co-applications has been far less, numbering 75 compared to Huawei’s 491; 32 have 
been with universities, 27 with domestic firms, 1 with a foreign firm, 10 with national 
institutes, and 5 with individuals. The distribution of ZTE’s collaboration has been more 
than Huawei’s. Universities and domestic firms have been ZTE’s largest collaborators. 
Figure 4-2 again confirms that ZTE’s collaboration with the national institutes is not 
insignificant. While Huawei filed one patent application with one national institute, 
ZTE filed 10 patent applications with four national institutes, which accounted for 13.3 
per cent of its co-applications, further confirming that ZTE is an important partner for 
the national institutes in China. 
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Figure 4-2. ZTE’s co-applications to US PTO 
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4.3. Knowledge accumulation 
 This section analyzes knowledge accumulation by Huawei and ZTE. This 
accumulation comes from internal as well as external knowledge sources, and this 
accumulated knowledge contributes to a firm’s ability to innovate (Svetina, 2008). The 
internal accumulation of knowledge is a process by which a firm shapes a portfolio of 
core competencies (Prahalad et al., 1990). Core competencies are a firm’s collective 
knowledge about ‘how to coordinate diverse production skills and technologies.’ A 
firm’s internal knowledge source correlates to its absorptive capacity (Cohen et al., 
1990). Absorptive capacity is defined as ‘the ability of a firm to recognize the value of 
new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends.’ Both core 
competency and absorptive capacity are known as keys for a firm to innovate. 
Accordingly, the accumulation of knowledge can be considered as an important 
requisite for innovation. 
I conducted a patent citation analysis to measure Huawei’s and ZTE’s 
knowledge accumulation. Patent citation analysis is widely used to measure knowledge 
flow (Jaffe et al., 2002). The interpretation of patent citations is such that if patent A 
cites patent B, knowledge flows from B to A. To measure knowledge accumulation, I 
calculated the proportion of patent citations filed by the same applicant (self citation). 
To conduct the citation analysis, I relied on patent applications to the US PTO. 
This is because of the unavailability until recently of patent citations in patent 
applications to SIPO.4 When applying to the US PTO, patent applicants must disclose 
the prior art behind an invention. Failure to disclose all prior art results in no patent 
being granted. Consequently, patent applications to US tend to have more patent 
citations than those to other patent authorities. However, there is a limitation in using 
patent citations. A significant proportion of citations in a patent application to a patent 
authority come from domestic references of the patent authority (Michel et al., 2001). 
Accordingly, readers need to be aware that in this study a significant number of citations 
in a patent may come from US references. 
The results of the citation analysis are shown in Figure 5. The figure shows that 
Huawei and ZTE have grown increasingly reliant on internal knowledge (internal 
knowledge source) for patents. Until 2002 Huawei relied entirely on the knowledge 
received from external sources for its patents. Thereafter accumulated internal 
                                                   
4 At the 6th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People's 
Congress on December 27, 2008, Article 36 of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of 
China was amended to mandate the submission prior art: “When an applicant for an 
invention patent requests substantive examination, he shall submit the reference 
materials relating to the invention existing prior to the date of application.” 
knowledge began to become a source, and in 2009, 13 per cent of Huawei’s patents 
relied on knowledge obtained within itself. Although the knowledge flow from external 
sources still predominates, knowledge has accumulated within Huawei and this 
accumulated knowledge has assisted Huawei’s growth. The company’s knowledge 
dependence has fluctuated in recent years, but the trend of Huawei’s knowledge reliance 
has been increasing on its own internal source. Meanwhile, ZTE’s patents until 2003 
also relied entirely on the knowledge received from external sources. Thereafter reliance 
on internal knowledge for patents gradually increased. In 2009, 6 per cent of ZTE’s 
patents relied on knowledge obtained within. However, ZTE’s reliance on internal 
knowledge for patents has increased less than it has for Huawei. 
 
Figure 5. Self-citation Ratio 
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4.4. Knowledge spillover to domestic and foreign firms 
 The previous subsection measured knowledge accumulation by counting 
Huawei’s and ZTE’s self citations. This subsection measures knowledge spillover from 
Huawei and ZTE to others by focusing on applicants whose patent applications cite 
Huawei’s and ZTE’s patent applications; i.e., self citations are excluded for the analysis 
in this subsection. I used applications to the US patent office for the same reason as 
cited in the last subsection. Thus, this analysis also contains a US bias. 
 The results are shown in Table 6. The left side of the table show those for 
Huawei, the right side for ZTE. A total of 1106 patent applications to the US PTO cited 
Huawei’s patent applications, and they were filed from 25 different regions. The most 
applicants, more than 40 per cent of them, were from the US, followed by applicants 
from Japan (12.2 per cent) then Korea (10.9 per cent). Applicants from China accounted 
for only 7.4 per cent. For ZTE a total of 332 patent applications to the US PTO cited 
ZTE’s patent applications, and they were filed from 17 different regions. Interestingly, 
the most applicants (nearly 40 per cent) were from China; those from the US were next. 
In absolute patent count, ZTE is higher with 126 compared to Huawei’s 83. This 
indicates that there is a significant knowledge flow from ZTE to domestic firms (a point 
that will be further analyzed in this subsection). The results in Table 6 imply that 
Huawei’s technology is highly and globally valued by others when focusing on the 
number of Huawei’s forward citations compared to that of ZTE’s,5 but as a knowledge 
input, ZTE’s patents seem to be contributing more to Chinese domestic firms’ future 
R&D.  
 
Table 6: Top Five Regions of Origin for Applicants Seeking US patents That Cited 
Huawei’s and ZTE’s Patent Applications 
Huawei  ZTE’s 
Regional Origin 
Patent 
count 
Ratio 
 
Regional Origin Patent count Ratio 
US 485 43.5 %  China 126 38.0 % 
Japan 136 12.2 %  US 89 26.8 % 
Korea 122 10.9 %  Korea 33 9.9 % 
China 83 7.4 %  Japan 30 9.0 % 
Taiwan 57 5.1 %  Taiwan 20 6.0 % 
Other* 
(20 countries) 
233 20.9 % 
 Other** 
(12 countries) 
34 10.2 % 
* Other included Canada (46), Sweden 
(41), France (36), Finland (26), Germany 
(26), Israel (9), and Spain (9). 
 
** Other included Canada (14), Sweden 
(7), Finland (3), and the Netherlands (2). 
 
 Analyzing more closely who in China are using Huawei’s and ZTE’s patents 
for their future R&D, Figures 6-1 and 6-2 show the results for Huawei and ZTE, 
respectively. Eighty-three of the US patents shown in Table 6 cited Huawei patents and 
were filed by 19 firms. The largest share, accounting for 37.3 per cent (= 31 / 83 × 100) 
of the filings, was by ZTE. Seven patents each were filed by DaTang, H3C, China 
                                                   
5 More precisely speaking, the technological value of a patent can be better measured 
by dividing the number of forward citations by the average number of forward citations 
from the same application year and technological category (Jaffe et al., 2002; Nagaoka 
et al., 2010). But since Huawei and ZTE have a similar patent application history in the 
same industry, I assume that normalization will not change the findings. 
Iwncomm, and Utstarcom Telecom. On the other hand, 126 of the US patents in Table 6 
that cited ZTE were filed by 9 firms. The largest share, 89.7 per cent (= 113 / 126 × 100), 
was filed by Huawei. The remaining 13 patents were filed by 8 firms. The results 
presented here show that ZTE’s patent output as a knowledge source for China’s 
domestic R&D is by and large being absorbed by one company, Huawei. On the other 
hand, although Huawei’s patent output as a knowledge source for domestic R&D has 
been less than ZTE’s, its effect has spread to a wider distribution of firms (although 
ZTE has been the largest absorber). Figures 6-1 and 6-2 confirm that Huawei and ZTE 
are the most significant citers of each other’s patents, that they are the two leading firms 
in China’s telecommunications sector, as indicated by other studies (Harwit, 2007; Gao, 
2011), and that their knowledge has become interdependent. 
A comparison between Huawei’s and ZTE’s R&D collaborators and the 
absorption of knowledge from Huawei’s and ZTE’s R&D output by these collaborators 
reveals that the co-applicants of both companies (shown in subsection 4.2.) scarcely 
cited Huawei’s or ZTE’s patent applications. This implies that collaboration with 
Huawei and ZTE does not promote knowledge spillover from them to their 
collaborators. 
 
Figure 6-1. Chinese Patent Applicants That Cited Huawei’s Patent Applications 
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Figure 6-2. Chinese Patent Applicants That Cited ZTE’s Patent Applications 
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5. Discussion 
The findings of this study can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Huawei: This study used Huawei as a representative of China’s privately-owned 
enterprises. The study used patent statistics as a proxy indicating innovation (Griliches, 
1990), and these supported the argument that Huawei is an innovative actor. The 
number of its patent applications to domestic and foreign authorities is growing; the 
company’s internal knowledge is accruing; and spillover of this knowledge is going to 
both domestic and foreign firms. Huawei’s R&D output has functioned as a knowledge 
input for various domestic firms to conduct future R&D. This study also found that 
Huawei has been very active in UIC. This is attributable to Huawei being a leading 
domestic firm in its field making it hard to find qualified firms as collaborators. 
(2) ZTE: This study used ZTE as a representative of China’s state-owned enterprises. 
Although the number of its patent applications to domestic and foreign authorities has 
increasing rapidly, other patent statistics used in this study did not support ZTE as an 
innovative actor. More specifically, ZTE’s knowledge accumulation has not been as 
great as Huawei’s. The knowledge absorption of ZTE’s R&D output has been 
concentrated in Huawei. Nevertheless, this study indicates that ZTE is an important 
partner for national institutes. However, lack of data prevented an examination of how 
ZTE has contributed to collaboration with these institutes. 
 Based on the foregoing findings and discussion, the answer to the research 
questions posed in this study is that the capacity of China’s state-owned enterprises to 
innovate has essentially not outperform that of the privately-owned enterprises. It is 
something of a surprise that in recent years ZTE has filed more domestic and 
international patent applications than Huawei given that ZTE has only about half as 
many R&D employees as Huawei. This recent increase in filings may give ZTE the 
image of being more "innovatively productive" than Huawei. However, when 
comparing the statistics for ZTE’s patent applications with those for Huawei and other 
companies, ZTE’s recent boost in patent applications gives the impression of a company 
that has a great interest merely in patent filing per se. 
What has motivated ZTE to greatly boost its patent filing? One typical reason 
is competition in a patent race that has become global. This race is being sustained by a 
belief that a stronger intellectual property rights policy encourages innovation, and in 
this race, filing patent applications, whether these applications are granted or not, is an 
important tactic. As other companies have been doing, by applying for patents 
regardless of patentability, ZTE as a follower is now trying to make its knowledge 
known to the public before such knowledge is exclusively owned by other competitors, 
especially leaders. The intent is to prevent competitors from impinging on ZTE’s future 
R&D. This behavior gives a degree of freedom for future R&D and protects it from 
being narrowed down. However, there could be other reasons specifically for ZTE’s 
behavior, such as CEO leverage over company contracts by exhibiting ZTE’s 
performance to the government. Whatever the case, one cannot help but presume that 
the recent jump in ZTE’s patent has not been accidental. 
The results of this study present implications for researchers and policy makers. 
First, new indicators are needed to measure the performance of the state-owned 
enterprises. Prior studies have measured the performance of state-owned enterprises 
using conventional corporate indicators, concluding that these enterprises perform 
inefficiently. However, since state-owned enterprises are not aimed at profit 
maximization, it is not fair to evaluate them only with indicators used to evaluate 
privately-owned enterprises. The contributions of state-owned enterprises are 
sometimes difficult to measure. Thus, new indicators need to be introduced to fairly 
evaluate state-owned enterprises. 
Second, this study presented evidence that ZTE’s R&D output has been 
absorbed primarily by Huawei. This implies that in this case the knowledge created by 
the state-owned enterprise is valuable, and the privately owned domestic champion in 
the industry uses this knowledge as an input for future R&D. However, this study also 
shows that there are not enough innovating actors in the industry that can absorb the 
knowledge and create economic value based on it. Thus, this study suggests that the 
government devise policy to nurture innovating actors that can utilize the existing 
knowledge for innovation. 
Lastly, this study provides an implication for developing countries. A report by 
WIPO (2011) showed that 92% of all international patent applications are from 15 
advanced countries, implying that knowledge is monopolized by the advanced countries. 
Using such knowledge is not free. Thus, policy makers in developing countries, 
especially those trying to achieve knowledge-based economic growth, will have to find 
leverage for getting access to monopolized knowledge. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This study presented an empirical analysis of Huawei and ZTE, the two major 
enterprises in China’s telecommunications industry, using their patent data. The study 
first reviewed the prior research gone on the corporate performance of China’s 
privately-owned and state-owned enterprises, and the social background and economic 
reforms that these enterprises faced. After this review, patent data was used to 
investigate Huawei’s and ZTE’s innovation process. Four aspects of this process were 
analyzed: (1) domestic and international patent application pattern, (2) co-application 
and co-applicants, (3) knowledge accumulation inside of Huawei and ZTE, and (4) 
knowledge spillover to domestic and foreign firms. 
 However, this study is not without limitations. One is its assumption that the 
difference in Huawei’s and ZTE’s innovation is largely affected by the difference in 
their type of ownership. Nevertheless, these two companies are good representatives for 
comparing publically and privately owned enterprises in China. As pointed out, both are 
major players in the same industry, are operating in the same location, have experienced 
the same historical changes, and both have shown successful growth since founding. In 
addition, up-to-date data is availability for both companies; the data is suitability for 
examining the research questions; and various information sources are available to 
support or refute the findings. However, some of the study results may derive from 
factors other than the difference in ownership type. For example, as of 2013, Huawei 
had more than twice as many employees, 150,000 to ZTE’s 70,000.6 One might assume 
that this difference would give Huawei twice the resources of ZTE. Future research can 
elaborate further on the present study to remove the effect, if any, of this difference. 
 An agenda for future research will be to test the findings in this study in a 
quantitative manner using a larger sample of firms. Despite the limitation mentioned 
above, this case study of Huawei and ZTE provides valuable hints which can be the 
base for the next study, one that expands the analysis via quantitative research to other 
companies to test if the findings of this study are applicable to other cases. 
 
                                                   
6 Huawei’s and ZTE’s annual reports for 2013. 
 
Appendix A 
 The National Bureau of Statistics of China classifies Chinese firms into six 
groups in terms of ownership: State-owned enterprises, collectively-owned enterprises, 
shareholding enterprises, Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan funded enterprises, foreign funded 
enterprises, and other. The definitions of these enterprises, as stated by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, are shown in Table A1. 
 
Table A1. Firm classification in terms of ownership 
(1) State-owned 
enterprises 
Enterprises where the means of production or income are 
owned by the state. 
(2) 
Collectively-owned 
enterprises 
Enterprises where the means of production are owned 
collectively, including urban and rural enterprises invested by 
collectives and some enterprises. 
(3) Shareholding 
Corporations Ltd. 
Economic units registered in accordance with the regulation of 
the People’s Republic of China on the Management of 
Registration of Corporate Enterprises, with total registered 
capitals divided into equal shares and raised through issuing 
stocks. 
(4) Hong 
Kong-Macau-Taiwan 
funded enterprises 
Enterprises registered as the joint-venture, cooperative, sole 
(exclsive) investment industrial enterprises and limited liability 
corporations with funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 
(5) Foreign Funded 
Enterprises 
Enterprises registered as the joint-venture, cooperative, sole 
(exclsive) investment industrial enterprises and limited liability 
corporations with foreign funds. 
(6) Other 
Other enterprises (units) including private enterprises,  
joint-owned enterprises, share-holding economy, 
foreign-funded enterprises, enterprises funded by the 
entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, etc. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China: 13. Industry in “Classifications & 
Methods” 
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